Uprising Is Coming and Reconciliation Is Inevitable

2010-01-26
George Mitchell, US envoy to the Middle East, has concluded his latest tour of the region without achieving any tangible progress in the key mission of his tour, namely to bring about a resumption of the negotiations between the PNA and the Israeli Government. The following are the three main reasons for the failure of his tour and his return empty-handed to Washington.

First, Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu announced that Israel will maintain all major Jewish settlement blocs in the West Bank and full Israeli control of the Jordan rift valley, that is, the eastern border of any Palestinian state that may emerge as a result of a settlement between Israel and the PNA.

Second, Palestinian President Mahmud Abbas insisted on refusing to return to the negotiating table until after Netanyahu and his government have committed themselves to a complete freeze on settlement construction in all occupied West Bank and Jerusalem, defined a clear frame of reference for the negotiations as well as a specific time ceiling to the negotiations supported by international guarantees.

Third, US President Barack Obama made a statement acknowledging his administration's miscalculation of the obstacles in the way of the peace process and the limited US role, an acknowledgement that constituted a clear backing down on all his previous promises and commitments as well as his submission to the Israeli pressure to give up the condition for a settlement freeze, which he previously said was necessary for the resumption of the peace process.

The failure of Mitchell's mission, as official statements have made clear, means that a political vacuum will emerge (some call it stalemate). It also means the collapse of the Arab wager on the peaceful option and that the Arab peace imitative is no longer valid.

Previous experiences in the Arab region and elsewhere in the world show that a political vacuum is against the nature of things, that it will not last long, and that subsequent developments are inevitable to fill the vacuum in one way or another. The Arab region which over nearly two decades entertained the illusions of the peaceful process cannot continue without it, because very simply the Arab regimes did not think, and did not want to think, of any other option or alternatives or "plan B," as happens in civilized countries.

The PNA in Ramallah is talking "very shyly" of the possibility of instigating "a peaceful intifadah" in the West Bank, arranging for demonstrations, protests, or civil disobedience, and perhaps a return to the "weapon of stone-throwing" in emulation of the first intifadah, which led to bringing the PNA to Ramallah 16 years ago. We say "shyly" because when the first intifadah broke out 20 years ago, there was no PNA that completely relied on the Western donor nation's funds or whose police and security forces were supervised by US General Dayton, not to speak of the "VIP" cards to senior PNA officials, cabinet ministers, presidency, and Al-Muqata'ah [PNA headquarters in Ramallah].

The PNA is facing an unprecedented predicament because supporting an intifadah might actually mean dissolving itself and returning the West Bank to its previous status as completely occupied territory by Israeli forces. As such, the occupation would turn from a covert to an overt occupation and would entail that the Israeli Government shoulder its responsibility for administering the entire occupied territories, providing security, water, electricity, education, and health services to approximately 3 million Palestinians.

President Abbas is facing the same circumstances that the late Palestinian president, Yasir Arafat, had faced after the collapse of the Camp David negotiations, when he rejected the US pressure to accept the settlement that former US President Bill Clinton offered him. The main difference is that as soon as he returned home from Washington, Arafat opted for the resistance option. He formed the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, strengthened ties with Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad movement and sent envoys to Lebanon, Iran, and Europe in search for weapons. President Arafat paid dearly for that option in terms of the siege and isolation that was imposed on him at his headquarters in Ramallah, which ended with his martyrdom from poisoning. Arafat, may God have mercy on his soul, expected that honourable end and waited for it, and had what he wanted.

No one knows how long President Abbas will stick to his current position refusing to return to the negotiating table unless his conditions for a settlement freeze are met. He is coming under greater Arab pressure than US and European pressure. He and everyone know that the possibility of his dismissal may be in the minds of the US Administration and its European allies. We will not be surprised if they actually begin looking for a replacement, if not they have not already prepared a replacement since he made his decision not to run in any future presidential elections. When he announced that decision, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton responded by saying she would not regret his bowing out that she would deal with him in any position he might hold.

The Palestinian scene is "miserable" by any standard. President Abbas's term in office has expired and he does not want to run in any forthcoming elections, which no one knows when these elections will be held in the first place. The elected Legislative Council has no powers because its legal term has also expired and no elections loom in the horizon for replacing it. The same goes for all PLO institutions, such as the Palestine National Council, the Central Council, and the Executive Committee.

Israel too is facing a major predicament. It is hated and isolated internationally after the war crimes it committed during its aggression against the Gaza Strip, and its continued blockade of the Gaza Strip has increased hatred towards it. The collapse of Israel's relations with Turkey and the end of Israel's indirect negotiations with Syria have increased its regional isolation.

Netanyahu was eager to resume negotiations with the PNA according to his conditions. His goal was not to reach a settlement with the Palestinians, but he sought to gain time, improve Israel's image, dilute hatred towards Israel, prolong the life of his government, and provide cover to continue settlement construction and grab what has remained of East Jerusalem. His ambitions have evaporated, at least for the time being. He must be looking for a way out of his predicament.

Previous experiences showed that a resort to war had always been an Israeli option to emerge from a crisis and change equations on the ground. Former Israeli Prime Minister Menahem Begin did this when acts of resistance increased in Lebanon, invading that country in the summer of 1982. So did former Prime Minister Ehud Olmert when he launched an offensive on the Gaza Strip in an attempt to make up for his humiliating defeat in southern Lebanon. Netanyahu might do the same in the next weeks or months, whether by attacking south Lebanon or the Gaza Strip or both. He is looking for pretexts, and his government might fabricate them.

What might spur Netanyahu to attack the Gaza Strip or southern Lebanon is that there is a clear Arab support to such a step, particularly if Netanyahu sends Israeli tanks to the Gaza Strip. We have not heard one Arab country, except Syria, demanding lifting of the blockade on the Gaza Strip. The construction of a steel wall on the border with the Gaza Strip to stifle 1.5 million Palestinians may be a green light from the Egyptian Government to end Hamas's rule there once and for all. Egyptian President Husni Mubarak has never attacked Hamas as harshly as he did in the latest speech he delivered on the Police Day. In fact, some Egyptian officials have gone so far as to threaten to invade and destroy the Gaza Strip to punish it and avenge the death of an Egyptian soldier on the border three weeks ago.

What makes us tend to believe that there is an Arab-Israeli-US plan to end the current situation in the Gaza Strip (Hamas's control) through military means is that the policy of starving the people and imposing the blockade has failed to instigate the people to revolt against Hamas. And the delay up to this day in rebuilding 60,000 houses that were destroyed by the Israeli aggression in Gaza may be the result of some "understanding" to keep the situation as it is pending a decisive Israeli military operation.

Embarking on an aggression against the Gaza Strip will not be easy and may lead to exacerbating Israel's predicament. The Israeli aggression in early last year did not lead to ending Hamas's control, staging a coup against it, or uprooting the culture of resistance. The result of the aggression has been quite the opposite. The people of the Gaza Strip will resist any aggression as they did in the first. They will continue their resistance if the Israeli forces decide to stay long in the Gaza Strip. The people of Gaza must have learned some lessons from the first aggression and we may see the result if Netanyahu decides to carry out his threats.

Palestinian reconciliation is now closer than at any time before, particularly if President Abbas continues to stick to his position and if Fatah decides to launch a peaceful intifadah in the West Bank, to completely wash its hands of the futile negotiations, and return to its original position that made it a pioneering resistance movement. In our view, the countdown for Palestinian reconciliation has started, or must start. A reconciliation reached on the basis of resistance, peaceful or military, will be the best and most effective way-out [of the current situation].